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ABSTRACT
In popular discussion much has been made recently of the susceptibility of government policies to
lobbying by foreigners. The general presumption has also been that such interactions have a
deleterious effect on the home economy. However, it can be argued that, in a trade policy context,
bending policy in a direction that would suit foreigners may not in fact be harmful: If the policy
outcome absent any lobbying by foreigners is characterized by welfare-reducing trade barriers,
lobbying by foreigners may result in reductions in such barriers and raise consumer surplus (and
possibly improve welfare). Using a new data set on foreign political activity in the US, this paper
investigates the relationship between trade protection and lobbying activity empirically. The
approach taken in this paper is primarily a structural one. To model the role of foreign and domestic
lobbies in determining trade policy, we develop first a theoretical framework building on the well-
known work of Grossman and Helpman (1994); the econometric work that follows is very closely
linked to the theory. Our analysis of the data suggests that foreign lobbying activity has significant
impact on trade policy - and in the predicted direction: Tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are
both found to be negatively related with foreign lobbying activity. We consider also extended
specifications in which we include a large number of additional explanatory variables that have been
suggested in the literature as determinants of trade policy (but that emerge from outside of the














A growing body of work in economics views trade policy as being determined not by a
benign welfare-maximizing government (as was assumed in the traditional treatments of this
topic) but rather by interactions between politicians and organized special interest groups.1
The emphasis in much of this literature (particularly on the empirical side) has been on the
link between domestic industry lobbies and the government. Recent events,2 however, have
shifted the focus in popular discussion (as well as in the consequent policy proposals related
to campaign ﬁnance reform) to foreign lobbies and the extent to which these are involved in
the political process; the general presumption being that such interactions between foreigners
and the domestic government have a deleterious eﬀect on the home economy.
In a trade policy context, however, it can be argued that bending policy in a direction
that would suit foreigners may not in fact be harmful: If the policy outcome absent any
involvement by foreigners is characterized by welfare-reducing (or sub-optimal) trade barri-
ers, lobbying by foreigners for reductions in such barriers may in fact shift trade policy in
a direction that improves domestic consumer surplus (and possibly welfare).3 But is it so?
Do foreign lobbies have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on US trade policy? If so, by what magnitude?
It is this relationship between foreign lobbies and trade barriers that this paper attempts to
investigate empirically.
1See, for instance, the pioneering papers by Findlay and Wellisz (1982), Hillman (1982), Bhagwati and
Feenstra (1982), Mayer (1984), Magee, Brock and Young (1989) and, most recently, the pioneering work of
Grossman and Helpman (1994). This interest group approach to modeling trade policy determination itself
has antecedents in the seminal work of Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976) and Becker (1983), all of whose work
on regulation focused, inter alia, on why the political process favors speciﬁc industries over others.
2These include the widespread accusations relating to foreign campaign contributions in the 1996 US
Presidential campaign and the conviction of Representative Jay Kim (Republican-CA) for his acceptance of
illegal contributions from Korean sources. For a more detailed discussion of these events and an attempt
to quantify the signiﬁcant presence of foreign lobbies in the US, see the recent MIT Ph.D. dissertation of
Byoung-Joo Kim (1999).
3It is perhaps worth emphasizing emphasize that while lower trade barriers (on account of foreign lobbying,
say) can certainly be expected to improve consumer surplus, they do not necessarily translate into aggregate
welfare improvement. The latter would require a demonstration that trade barriers, in the absence of foreign
lobbies, would in fact be at a sub-optimal level − a contention whose validity is diﬃcult to evaluate given
the imperfectly competitive nature of the product market assumed in our analysis (as will be discussed in
detail shortly) and the complex combination of tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers actually imposed in reality. Our
focus in the present paper is solely on the relationship between lobbying activity and trade policy.
2The theoretical foundation that we develop to motivate our estimating equations borrows
extensively from the well-known model of endogenous policy determination developed by
Grossman and Helpman (1994) − which is altered here suitably to account for the role of
foreign lobbies. This framework assumes a government that trades oﬀ its desire to deliver a
higher level of welfare to its polity with its desire for political contributions from organized
industry lobbies (which, in turn, provide political contributions to the government so it may
move policy in a direction that would suit them). A substantial merit of this framework,
from at least the standpoint of empirical testing, is that despite its relative rigor and com-
plexity, trade policy is predicted to be a simple function of relatively few variables. This,
as we show, proves to be true even after foreign political involvement is introduced. In the
import-competing sectors, for instance, equilibrium tariﬀs are simply a log-linear function
of the import-penetration ratio, the import demand elasticity, the presence (or absence) of
domestic and foreign lobbying activity in that sector and ﬁnally a parameter that measures
the emphasis that the government places on contributions relative to overall welfare. This
parsimonious speciﬁcation enables relatively easy econometric implementation − a task that
we accomplish using econometric methodology similar to that detailed in the recent and
pioneering work of Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandhyopadhyay (2000).4
Our estimation results suggest that foreign lobbying has a statistically and economically
signiﬁcant impact on trade policy: The presence of an organized foreign lobby representing a
particular industrial sector appears to have as much eﬀect in lowering trade barriers against
imports in that sector as does the presence of a domestic lobby in raising trade barriers
there. Ceteris paribus, US consumers gain unambiguously from the presence of foreign
political activity. To evaluate the robustness of our results, we also estimate “extended”
speciﬁcations in which we include a large number of additional explanatory variables that
have been suggested in the literature as determinants of trade policy (but that emerge from
outside of the theoretical structure described above).5
4See also the recent paper by Mitra et al. (2002) which uses this framework to investigate the endogenous
determination of trade policy in Turkey.
5Treﬂer (1993), which studied the protective impact of trade barriers in a context where protection
3As we discuss in greater detail later, the results are highly robust to changes in data handling
and construction methodology and to changes in speciﬁcation. Estimates of the parsimonious
speciﬁcation implied by the theory compare very well with those obtained from the extended
regressions discussed above.
Overall then, this paper makes the following contributions: First, it is the only formal study
of foreign lobbying activity and its economic impact of which we are aware. While several
scholars and observers have commented on the presence and importance of foreign lobbying
in the context of trade policy formulation,6 none has studied it in the manner or the detail
that we do here. Second, a substantial component of the research eﬀort on this paper has
involved the compilation of a new data set on foreign political activity (whose structure and
sources we describe in detail in Section V and in the attached Data Appendix). Finally,
we believe that our results, which run counter to much of the popular opinion on foreign
lobbies, contribute to the public debate on the impact of foreign lobbies that has recently
arisen in the context of discussions on campaign ﬁnance reform.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes brieﬂy the extent of foreign
lobbying and the evolution of the legal context in which foreign lobbies operate in the US.
Section III describes the theoretical framework that underlies our empirical exercise. Section
IV presents the econometric model and discusses data and estimation issues in detail. Section
V describes our results. Section VI concludes.
II. Foreign Political Activity in the United States
Government concern regarding foreign inﬂuence on policy has a long history in the United
States. Thus, for instance, political activity by foreigners was very much on the mind of
itself was treated as endogenous and reported dramatic evidence to this eﬀect, is an excellent example of
work in this tradition. As we have discussed in Gawande and Krishna (2001), a recent survey of empirical
analyses in the literature on the political economy of trade policy, the use of extended speciﬁcations has the
merit of (a type of) comprehensiveness − every observable variable that we conjecture to be relevant to the
determination of trade policy may be included as an explanatory factor. However, this also has the demerit
that the variables included in the right-hand side sometimes have only very tenuous links with the theories
that motivate their inclusion in the regression equations. On this point, see also Rodrik (1995).
6See, for instance, Baldwin (1985), Choate (1990) and Hillman and Ursprung (1988).
4James Madison when he successfully proposed that legislation impacting the commerce of
the United States with foreign powers require only the approval of a simple majority, rather
than a super-majority, as was required for treaties. His reasoning was that foreign powers
could more easily defeat a tariﬀ proposal by inﬂuencing, via bribes, the nine (out of the,
then, twenty six) senators required to defeat a super-majority than they could the fourteen
required to defeat a majority. Madison argued that
The power of foreign nations to obstruct our retaliating measures [and with suc-
cessful retaliation on the injurious restrictions of foreign powers] on them by a
corrupt inﬂuence would also be less if a majority should be made competent than
if two-thirds of each House should be required to legislate acts in this case.
The potential for harmful foreign intrigue was very real to the founders and was addressed
in no fewer than ﬁfteen of the Federalist Papers. Alexander Hamilton stated his view of the
corrupting impact of foreign political presence by writing that
One of the weak sides of republics, among their numerous advantages, is that they
aﬀord too easy an inlet to foreign corruption... Hence it is that history furnishes
us with so many mortifying examples of the prevalence of foreign corruption in
republican governments. How much this contributed to the ruin of the ancient
commonwealths has been already disclosed. [Hamilton, Federalist #22]
Further, Hamilton also argued that
Nothing was more to be desired than that every practicable obstacle should be
opposed to cabal, intrigue, and corruption. These most deadly adversaries of re-
publican government might naturally have been expected to make their approaches
from more than one quarter, but chieﬂy from the desire in foreign powers to gain
an improper ascendant in our councils [Hamilton, Federalist #68].
5Nevertheless, as Corrado et al.(1997) note,7 for many years there was no ban or limit placed
on foreign political contributions. This changed in 1938 when, in the face of evidence of
Nazi money spent to inﬂuence US political debate, Congress passed the so-called Foreign
Agents Registration Act (FARA). This law required agents of foreign entities engaged in
publishing “political propaganda” to register and disclose their activities, but it did not
regulate political contributions. In 1966, after congressional hearings in 1962-63 revealed
campaign contributions to federal candidates by Philippine sugar producers and agents of
Nicaraguan president Luis Somoza, Congress moved to prohibit political contributions in
any US election by any foreign government, political party, corporation or individual (except
foreign nationals who were permanent residents of the US).
The contrast with restrictions on domestic inﬂuence in the electoral process may be clariﬁed
as follows. US nationals may make direct political contributions. US corporations and labor
unions, while generally restricted from making contributions from their treasury funds to
election candidates, may still make contributions through “voluntary” funds collected by
“political action committees” (PACs), which are composed of their employees and members
respectively.8 Despite the 1966 regulations (described in the previous paragraph) seeking to
prevent the inﬂuence of foreign interests on US policymaking, legal contributions from sources
with foreign ties are still allowed. “Foreign agents”, i.e., US citizens acting as lobbyists for
foreign governments or oﬃcials, foreign individuals, or foreign businesses or associations can
make campaign contributions like any other US citizen provided that they are registered with
the Justice Department (in accordance with the Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA) of
1938 which we have mentioned above) and that the contributions are made with their own
7The discussion that follows borrows extensively from the comprehensive Brookings survey by these
authors.
8It is worth pointing out that contributions by US entities may be classiﬁed as either being in “hard
money” (which is money that is limited and otherwise regulated through federal election laws and can be
used directly in connection with election for federal oﬃce) or in “soft money” (which is generally subject to no
limits but may only be used indirectly in the political process - for such purposes as “getting-out-the-vote”
and “issue advocacy”. Corporations and unions, while banned from making hard money contributions,
except through PACs (as described above), may still make unlimited soft money contributions - as can
individuals. However, since our study is set in the 1970s, soft money contributors and contributions (which
did not really assume signiﬁcance until the early 1990s) are not an important consideration and we ignore
them entirely.
6funds. By all popular accounts, the fungibility of cash ﬂows and generally lax monitoring
of the activities of foreign agents has implied that in practice, agents of foreign interests
have contributed actively to political campaigns on behalf of their principals.9 It is on these
foreign agents that we focus our attention in this study.
A measure of the extent of foreign agent activity in absolute terms and in relation to lobbying
by domestic corporate PACs can be obtained by examining the following ﬁgures. At the
beginning of the time period of our study, the 1978 election cycle, there were roughly 800
corporate PACs in operation. In comparison, in the same period, there were approximately
250 foreign agents in active operation. In the 1978 election cycle, these corporate PACs
contributed approximately a total of 10 million dollars to federal election campaigns, whereas
foreign agent expenditures added up to about 14 million dollars. Further, it may be noted
that in contrast to foreign agents, domestic PACs are interested in a much broader range of
economic policy making than simply trade policy or other externally related matters. Thus,
it becomes clear that in the trade policy arena, the extent of foreign agent activity was not
of an entirely lower order of magnitude than domestic lobbying. The impact on trade policy
of this lobbying activity by domestic and foreign entities is what we study in the rest of this
paper.
III. Theory
The theoretical framework we use closely parallels that of Grossman and Helpman (1994)
- but with some important modiﬁcations to allow for the role of foreign lobbies. Consider
an open economy which is populated by individuals with identical preferences but diﬀerent
factor endowments. Each individual maximizes utility given by




where c0 denotes consumption of the numeraire good, good 0 and ci denotes consumption of
goods i =1 ....n. Further, the sub-utilities ui are assumed to be quadratic with parameters
9For a detailed discussion and accounting of the role of foreign agents in recent campaigns, see
http://www.opensecrets.org.
7such that domestic demand for the non-numeraire goods is assumed to take the linear form
Pi = A − Qi,i =1 ....n. (2)
where Qi denotes aggregate consumption of good i.
Good 0 is assumed to be produced from labor alone by Ricardian technology (with input-
output coeﬃcient equal to one) and is assumed to be freely traded internationally in perfectly
competitive markets. Goods i =1 ...n are assumed to be produced with constant returns
technologies using labor alone (or alternately using ﬁxed and speciﬁc capital, as in Grossman
and Helpman, and technology which gives constant returns in labor), but are assumed to be
sold in internationally segmented oligopolistically competitive markets with supply provided
by ﬁxed numbers of domestic and international ﬁrms (as in Brander and Krugman (1983))
which compete in Cournot-Nash fashion.10
Focusing on the home market for any good i, and using j(h,f) as a country index to denote
home (h) and foreign (f), we let
q
j
i denote the quantity sold of i by any one ﬁrm from j
Pi denote the equilibrium price of the good i,
π
j
i denote proﬁts made by an individual ﬁrm from j operating in sector i,
τi denote the speciﬁc tariﬀ imposed on imports of good i,
n
j




i denote the total number of ﬁrms operating in i, and
ci denote the constant marginal cost of production involved in the production of i.11
10It should be clear that considering alternative forms of competition, such as Bertrand competition, for
instance, will not alter the basic result which we derive here − that domestic ﬁrms would like to have higher
tariﬀs and that foreign ﬁrms would like to have tariﬀs against them lowered. With non-tariﬀ barriers, we
run into the possibility that both domestic and foreign ﬁrms may, under some circumstances, prefer to have
higher levels of barriers on imports, as the well-known work of Krishna (1989) showed. In any event, as we
discuss later, we examine both types of trade barriers separately and allow the results to tell us whether
observed trade barriers are higher or lower with domestic and foreign lobbying.
11We should note that the assumption here that marginal costs of production are constant across domestic
and foreign ﬁrms is made purely for notational convenience. Our resulting expressions do not change if we
were to allow for costs to be diﬀerent for domestic and foreign ﬁrms.
8For any given tariﬀ rate, the outcome of the oligopolistic competition in the home market
may be easily derived: The nh







































Having described the features of the economy which determine equilibrium quantities and
prices of goods as a function of trade policy, we move on to the determination of trade
policy itself: As modeled by Grossman and Helpman (1994), trade policy is determined by
interactions between the government and organized lobbies - here representing (separately)
domestic and foreign ﬁrms.
The government’s objective function is assumed to be a weighted function of lobbying con-
tributions and the three components of welfare: consumer surplus, producer surplus and



















9where Lh denotes the sectors with organized domestic lobbies, Ch
i denotes lobbying contri-
butions by the domestic lobby (if any) in i, Lf denotes the set of organized foreign lobbies,
C
f





i denotes domestic producer proﬁts, a is a constant reﬂecting the government’s
preference for welfare relative to domestic campaign contributions and ﬁnally b is a constant
reﬂecting the government’s preference for foreign contributions relative to domestic contri-
butions. Diﬀerentiating the weights on foreign and domestic lobbying contributions allows
us to empirically investigate whether they are in fact diﬀerent.
The lobbies representing domestic and foreign ﬁrms in any sector would like trade policy to
be set in a manner that suits them - for example, a domestic lobby in import-competing
sector i would typically want import barriers on imports of i and import subsidies on imports
of all other goods, whereas a foreign lobby in sector i would want this government to subsidize
the imports of i. The interaction between the various lobbies and the government that we
have in mind has the structure of a “menu-auction” problem - exactly as in Grossman and
Helpman (1994). Thus, it is assumed that a lobby representing organized sector i makes
political contributions to the government contingent on the trade policy vector it implements.
The political equilibrium here is the outcome of a two-stage non-cooperative game in which
lobbies choose their political contributions in the ﬁrst stage and the government sets policy
in the second. An equilibrium is a set of contribution functions (functions of the trade
policy vector), one for each organized lobby group, such that each contribution maximizes
the welfare of the lobby taking as given the joint welfare of the other groups and the political
optimization of the government in the next stage, and an import tax vector that maximizes
government objectives taking the contribution schedules as given.
We assume further that the contribution schedules of the lobbies are “truthful” (using the
terminology of Bernheim and Whinston (1985) and Grossman and Helpman (1994)). This is
to say that they truthfully reﬂect everywhere the true preferences of the lobbies - since they
pay to the government the excess of the lobby’s gross welfare for any given policy relative to
some base level of net welfare B (which itself is endogenously determined). Formally, such










i denotes the gross welfare of the lobby representing j in sector i and B
j
i is a
constant denoting the lobby’s net welfare.12
Letting α denote the fraction of the home population that is organized into any domestic






















The ﬁrst-order condition corresponding to the choice of τi, following from
∂G
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i is an indicator variable that takes the value one if domestic sector i is organized




Working out the various terms in (11) (using (3), (4), (5) and (6)), substituting these back
in and some tedious algebra (along with a minor approximation) gives us
12The assumption that contributions are truthful is made here for expositional convenience and, strictly
speaking, need not be made to determine the equilibrium trade policy vector, as Grossman and Helpman





























where Xi denotes aggregate production of i in the home economy, mi denotes imports and
￿i is an imports elasticity measure − it measures the “observed” proportionate change in





, when the price changes are caused by changes in
tariﬀs. Overall, the prediction of the model regarding the cross-sectional determinants of tar-
iﬀs (as represented by (12) above) are quite intuitive. Sectors that are politically represented
by organized domestic lobbies are, ceteris paribus, likely to receive more protection (i.e., Ih
i
enters positively). Sectors in which there is foreign political presence are likely to receive
less protection (i.e., I
f
i enters negatively). Finally, sectors in which there is neither domestic
political representation nor foreign political presence are predicted to receive positive pro-
tection (which should not be surprising − given the assumptions regarding the imperfectly
competitive nature of the product market).13
In closing the theoretical discussion, we note two particular features of the theoretical frame-
work we have just described.
First, consider “counter-lobbying” or the lobbying by sectors for lower import barriers on
goods not produced by them (in a direction counter to that of the producers of these goods).
It should be clear that our treatment of counter-lobbying is entirely analogous to that of
Grossman and Helpman (1994). In both analyses, proﬁts of domestic producers are inde-
pendent of the prices of goods other than those they sell. And, in both, domestic producers
care about prices of other goods since they are assumed to consume them. The lobbying
by domestic interest groups reﬂects this concern in both cases (as seen from the fact that
their contributions are contingent on the entire vector of goods prices and not just on the
price of the good they produce). Thus, there is no substantial diﬀerence in the assumed
structure of counter-lobbying in our framework when compared with the theory of Gross-
13It is perhaps worth clarifying that the number of ﬁrms, n
f
i and nh
i , and their individual outputs do not
enter on the right-hand side of (12) since their eﬀect is captured for most part by total imports and total
domestic production as represented in (12) by X
m.
12man and Helpman (1994) or with the empirical implementation of tests of this framework
such as the one by conducted by Goldberg and Maggi (1999). We should note further that
in ongoing research, Gawande and Krishna (2003), we are examining the issue of counter-
lobbying (motivated by cross-sectoral usage of inputs) in a more formal and detailed manner
by extending the theory to allow for heterogeneous usage of intermediate inputs across sec-
tors (i.e., integrating the input-output matrix into the analysis) and using the closed-form
predictions regarding trade protection that are derived as the basis for our estimating equa-
tions. However, our estimation results suggest surprisingly little counter-lobbying in US
data. Estimates from simpler speciﬁcations that do not take intermediates usage into proper
account are nearly identical to those obtained from the more sophisticated speciﬁcation that
we have described above.14 We should note also that extensions of the theory of Grossman
and Helpman (1994) (and thus also the present framework) in which labor market linkages
provide a second “general-equilibrium” motivation for counter-lobbying (i.e., in addition to
the intermediates linkages discussed above) can be considered.15 However, the empirical rel-
evance of such general equilibrium linkages in providing a motivation for political lobbying
is likely to be small and we ignore them here.
Second, as we have already noted, varying the theory by assuming a diﬀerent mode of product
market competition and allowing protection to be provided by alternative instruments, such
as voluntary export restraints may generate the prediction that foreign lobbies and domestic
lobbies work in the same direction. If this were predominantly the case, estimation of (12)
should deliver coeﬃcients on domestic and foreign lobbying with the same sign. This is a
possibility that is not precluded by our estimation methodology (as described below); we are
willing to let the data inform us as to whether this is in fact the case.
14These results are available from the authors on request.
15Thus, for instance, it can be argued that an increase in protection in one sector causes an increase in
labor demand there, raising the price of labor and production costs in all other sectors.
13IV. Econometric Speciﬁcation, Data and Estimation
Methodology
IV.1 Econometric Speciﬁcation
Equation (12) motivates our basic estimating equation. After the introduction of an (addi-


































where ti denotes the (eﬀective) ad-valorem import tax (i.e.,
τi







a+α and β3 = − 2b
a+α. Clearly, β1 and β2 are predicted to be greater than zero and β3 is less
than zero.
IV.2 Data
In the estimation of the equation (13) above we employ primarily data from the period 1978-
1982. The study is conducted at the four-digit SIC level of disaggregation, and is focused
on U.S. manufacturing industries. Protection is measured using information on both tariﬀs
and non-tariﬀ barriers.16 The inverse of the import penetration ratio,
Xi
mi, is taken directly from the annual survey of manufactures.17 The import demand elasticity,
￿i, for various industries is taken from the study by Sheills, Deardorﬀ and Stern (1986). These
are estimated at the three-digit SIC level, and are replicated at our four-digit level here.18
16Previous studies that have examined empirically this new generation of political economy models (such as
Gawande and Bandhyopadhyay (2000) and Goldberg and Maggi (1999)) have generally only used non-tariﬀ
barriers to represent the level of trade protection. Our study is the ﬁrst to use US tariﬀs in this context.
17Since the concordance from the system of trade data (TSUS for these years, and Harmonized system in
recent years) into the SIC system of industrial data is less than perfect, a few industries register zero imports.
For these industries, the inverse import-penetration ratio is undeﬁned and they are dropped. In the end,
our sample comprises of 248 industries and accounts for over two-thirds of manufacturing value-added.
18The fact that most industry data (including that on political activity) is available at the four-digit level
while data on elasticities is only available at the three-digit level poses a potential problem for us as to the
level of disaggregation at which the analysis is to be conducted. Since much of the interest in the present
exercise is in lobbying activity and since econometric analyses conducted by us elsewhere (Gawande and
Bandhyopadhyay (2000)) suggests that elasticities turn out to bear relatively little of explanatory burden in
this context, we choose to conduct the analysis at the four-digit level here.
14The binary variables for domestic and foreign political organization, I and I∗ respectively,
are measured using political expenditures data we have constructed at the four-digit level.
Issues pertaining to their measurement and those of the other variables are discussed at
length below, and an appendix provides further details on their construction.
Protection Measures
The theory on which our model is founded simply dictates that the protection measure
equal the proportional diﬀerence between domestic prices and world prices. In practice,
however, choosing between alternative trade barrier measures in order to capture the extent
of protection is a diﬃcult (and familiar) problem. In a world in which tariﬀs are the only
form of protection, the choice is obvious: the tariﬀ rate itself is the precise measure of the gap
between domestic and foreign prices. When non-tariﬀ barriers (NTBs) are in use instead, the
situation is more diﬃcult because we generally lack even moderately satisfactory measures of
the tariﬀ equivalents of those non-tariﬀ barriers. What many researchers have used instead
is the “coverage ratio,” i.e., the proportion of imports within any industry that is covered by
non-tariﬀ barriers, as the measure of protection by NTBs. When tariﬀs and NTBs are both
known to be in use, it is hard to argue the merits of one protection measure over another.
We are agnostic on this issue and simply report results using both tariﬀ and NTB coverage
ratios.19
Foreign and Domestic Lobbying Organization
We compiled data on foreign political organization using U.S. government reports on the ad-
ministration of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). As we have mentioned before,
these are annual reports put together by the Attorney General’s oﬃce for the US Congress
19The problems with using coverage ratios as a proxy for the extent of protection oﬀered by NTBs are many
and have been quite well discussed in the literature. Thus, for instance, the coverage ratio is an imprecise
measure of non-tariﬀ protection for at least the reason that NTBs are heterogeneous in their intensity. That
is, industries with a large fraction of products covered by very lenient NTBs would be measured with a high
coverage ratio and deemed to be highly protected, while industries in which a lower fraction of products are
covered by highly restrictive barriers would be deemed to be less protected, and this may or may not reﬂect
the aggregate extent of protection actually provided by the NTBs. We have nothing new to add to this issue
here and, as we have just noted, simply proceed by using both tariﬀ and NTB coverage ratios.
15and contain detailed and extensive records of political spending patterns in the US of foreign
commercial entities from various countries (through so-called “foreign agents” based in the
US). All FARA entries were organized by industry and total spending by foreign commer-
cial entities per unit value-added of imports for each industry was obtained. Similarly, for
domestic lobbies, data was organized by industry and corporate lobby expenditures per unit
value-added were determined by industry (See Data Appendix for details). The compila-
tion of this data and their organization is an innovation in the literature, and a distinctive
contribution of this paper to it. The FARA data we organized and use primarily is from
the years 1978-82. In addition, to check robustness, we also use FARA data from the years
1972-1975. However, as we discuss later, the FARA reports are less detailed in this earlier
time period and so we are forced to organize and limit our estimation exercises with this
data accordingly.
Following the practice of Goldberg and Maggi (1999), thresholds were used to determine
whether the foreign political organization dummy variable was to be assigned a value of one.
This is done with a view to “allowing” for a more continuous representation of the intensity
of lobbying activity while remaining true to the theory that quite speciﬁcally requires a
discrete zero-one variable to represent the existence of lobbies. We used several thresholds
for the purpose of investigating the robustness of the results to a variety of deﬁnitions
for I∗. The domestic political organization variable I was also deﬁned on the basis of
thresholds. In the cases central to our discussion, the domestic political organization dummy
was assigned a value of one if the mean of domestic PAC spending per thousand dollars
of sectoral value-added (in the period under study, 1978-1982) was in excess of 0.05 and
0.10. Foreign political organization was assigned as follows. The percentile distribution
of expenditures per unit value-added was ﬁrst determined. Four percentile thresholds, in
increasing order of expenditures per unit value-added, are presented in the table: the 0th
percentile, the 50th percentile, the 75th percentile and the 85th percentile. For any given
threshold, say the 50th percentile, the sector was assigned an I∗ = 1 if that sector was in
that percentile for all of the four years in the sample period (1978, 1979, 1981 and 1982).20
20To ensure that our results are not being driven by the diﬀerent ways in which the domestic and foreign
16A separate set of results is reported for which an additional criterion was used to assign the
foreign political organization variable: the FARA report had to have indicated speciﬁcally
that the foreign agent had made eﬀorts to contact oﬃcials from the US government. We
take this to imply that those contributions were directed at inﬂuencing government policy.
For this subset of the FARA contributions, four diﬀerent I∗’s were constructed using the
same percentile cutoﬀs. In sum, eight sets of regressions are reported for each threshold
used to determine domestic political organization: Four sets corresponding to the cutoﬀs
used to determine foreign political organization and four additional sets when only those
FARA entries which indicated that the relevant foreign agent had speciﬁcally made eﬀorts
to lobby the US government were used.
Import Elasticities and Other Variables
Xi
mi is the inverse import-penetration ratio and is measured using readily available census data
on domestic production and imports. Import demand elasticities were taken from the well
known study by Sheills, Stern and Deardorﬀ (1986). As we have already discussed, in order
to conduct the analysis at the four-digit level (and thereby exploit the detailed information
on industry characteristics - political activity in particular - that are available at this level)
their estimates of elasticities at the three-digit SIC level were replicated at the four-digit
level for this study (i.e., for every four-digit SIC industry, the corresponding three-digit
elasticity was directly used). Since the import demand elasticities on the right-hand side of
(13) are proxied by import demand elasticity estimates rather than actual measures, there
is a potentially severe errors-in-variables problem that must be dealt with, given the widely
varying levels of precision associated with the estimates. We deal with this as in Gawande
and Bandhyopadhyay (2000), where Fuller’s (1986) method is used to purge the elasticity
data of the errors-in-variables problem.
IV.3 Estimation
political organization variables are assigned, we also ran the IV regressions using quartile cut-oﬀs for both.
As we discuss in the next section, this does not impact the results by much. Those results were reported in
the working paper version of this paper and are available from the authors upon request.
17Estimation of (13) raises a number of issues having to do with the right-hand-side variables
in the equation. First, the right-hand-side variables, the import penetration ratio and the
lobby dummies indicating whether or not a given sector is politically organized in the home
country and abroad, are potentially endogenous. Moreover, what appears on the right-hand
side is not simply a linear function of these endogenous variables but is rather the sum
of non-linear products of these variables. In order to consistently estimate the structural
coeﬃcients of the system, we therefore use the two-stage least squares estimator proposed
by Kelejian (1971). We use as “exogenous” variables mostly those variables used as instru-
ments by Gawande and Bandhyopadhyay (2000) and Goldberg and Maggi (1999): Industry
endowments (such as capital stocks, inventories, labor stocks and industry natural resource
use) are used to instrument for the import penetration ratio. Seller concentration ratios and
unemployment levels are used to instrument for domestic political organization (as suggested
by the well-known work of Olson (1965)) and the ratio of exports by foreigners to the US to
their worldwide exports in an industry (indicative of the relevance of the US as an export
market to these suppliers) is used additionally to instrument for foreign political organiza-
tion. Following Kelejian’s methodology, in the ﬁrst stage, reduced form equations for each
of the (transformed) right-hand-side variables (i.e., X
m · 1
|￿|, I · X
m · 1
|￿| and I∗ · X
m · 1
|￿|) are esti-
mated using as instruments the exogenous variables listed above, their quadratic terms and
their second-order cross product terms (see also Strickland and Weiss (1976) for a similar
methodology in a diﬀerent economic context).21 Estimation in the second stage proceeds as
usual.
V. Econometric Results
Summary statistics for variables employed in our analysis are provided in Table A.1 titled
“Descriptive Statistics.” The 1982 tariﬀ data have a sample mean of 6.5%. NTB coverage
ratios have a mean value of 0.08. Of primary interest are the absolute import demand
elasticity |￿| which has a mean of 1.49 and the inverse import penetration divided by the
21Kelejian shows that if the nonlinear expressions, for example, X
m · I, are regressed on linear, squared
and ﬁrst-order cross products of the exogenous variables in the system (13)-(16), then the familiar two-stage
least squares estimator may be directly used, and has the desirable properties of consistency and asymptotic
eﬃciency.
18absolute import elasticity, or (X/m)/|￿| (scaled by 100 as noted in the Table A.1), which has
mean .30. As discussed earlier, we also estimate extended regressions in which the additional
variables in the table (concentration ratio, scale, percent-unionized, wage and K/L ratio) are
used.
We use a set of six tables to display our results. Tables I-IV contain estimates of (13)
obtained using a variety of measures to measure the level of protection and threshold levels
to assign I and I∗. Consider ﬁrst Tables IA and IB. Here the protection measure is the tariﬀ
rate. A threshold of PAC spending per thousand dollars of sectoral value-added greater than
0.05 was used to assign the domestic political organization variable. As noted earlier, I∗ is
assigned using four diﬀerent quartile cutoﬀs (corresponding to the four columns of the table).
In determining the quartile cutoﬀs for assigning I∗, Table IA considers all FARA entries in
manufacturing while Table IB includes only those entries which speciﬁcally cite attempts
to contact the government on the part of the foreign agent (as the respective table headers
indicate). In Tables IIA and IIB, we present corresponding results with NTB coverage ratios
used as the protection measure (and with methodology otherwise identical to the one used
to get to Tables IA and IB).
In both sets of tables, the coeﬃcients of central interest, β2 and β3, are statistically signiﬁcant
and have the signs predicted by the theory. β2 is positive, implying that domestic political
presence, holding all else constant, leads to higher trade barriers. β3 is negative, implying
that foreign political presence, holding all else constant, is correlated with lower tariﬀs.
This is true in all of the cases that we consider (in IA and IB). Notably, the magnitude of
the foreign coeﬃcient, β3, tends to be higher when we consider higher percentile thresholds
(with correspondingly smaller number of sectors with organized foreign representation). The
closeness of the magnitudes of the coeﬃcient estimates of β2 and β3 imply that in our theory
the structural coeﬃcient b, which measures the value of a foreign dollar in contributions
relative to a domestic dollar, is about one. That is, the estimates suggest that the government
places about equal weight on a dollar of domestic lobbying contribution as a dollar of foreign
19lobbying contribution. This is an interesting and robust feature of our results.22
Tables III (A&B) and IV (A&B) present results with thresholds for domestic PAC spending
per thousand dollars of value-added set at 0.10 instead. The results correspond closely to
those presented in Tables I and II (A&B): the coeﬃcient β2 is estimated signiﬁcant and
positive and the coeﬃcient β3 is estimated signiﬁcant and negative - just as the theory
predicts. Here too, in almost all cases, the coeﬃcient β3 is estimated to be higher when
higher percentile requirements are imposed on the foreign political organization variable.
Estimates of the coeﬃcient β1 are nearly always estimated to be insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. It would appear from the deﬁnitions of β1 and β2 (given below (13)), that the
structural parameter a may be recovered as the ratio of β1 to β2, and this calculation would
suggest that the value of a is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. That is, the estimates
suggest that the government formulates trade policy almost entirely on the basis of political
contributions, with little regard for welfare. That conclusion, however, is not necessarily
warranted here: Using the coeﬃcient β2 to infer the value of a, after using the fact that
the fraction of the population that is organized has to be necessarily less than one (i.e.,
α<1), implies an implausibly high value of a instead.23 This should perhaps not be too
surprising: that plausible estimates of the parameter a have proven diﬃcult to obtain is a
well-known point in the literature by now (See Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande
and Bandhyopadhyay (2000)).24
22Formal statistical tests, not reported here, examining the equality of magnitudes of the coeﬃcients β2
and β3 were conducted by us as well. In virtually all the parsimonious models using tariﬀ and NTB data,
this diﬀerence is found to not be statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level (the only exceptions being
parsimonious models run with tariﬀ data and using the 0th percentile cutoﬀ for I∗, in which case the diﬀerence
is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level). This is also true for all the extended models of Tables V
and VI where domestic and foreign lobbying have equivalent eﬀects on tariﬀs (in opposite directions).
23Note that given our scaling by 100 of (X/m)/￿, we have 2
a+α =
β2
100. Given the estimated values of β2
(around 0.2 - 0.5), this implies a very high value for a, when α<1.
24We should note, however, that problematic estimates of a should not lead the reader to necessarily
be sceptical as to whether the estimates of β2 and β3 are informative about the relative impact of other
determinants of trade policy (such as domestic political organization relative to foreign political organization
and so on). As modeled, the “variable” a is constant across industries while the other variables vary in the
cross section. That is to say, the former relates to the level of protection, while the latter also related to the
cross sectional variation in protection.
20The results based on the 1978-82 FARA data may then be summarized as follows: ceteris
paribus, tariﬀs and NTB coverage ratios are strongly positively correlated with the presence
of organized import-competing lobbies and negatively related to organized foreign lobbies.
This is in accord with the theory. The quantitative implications of the results are as follows.
Consider the 50th percentile cutoﬀ deﬁnition for I∗ in Table IA. The estimated value of β2
of 0.359 implies that if an industry is domestically organized then an increase of 0.1 in the
scaled value of inverse import penetration - to - import elasticity ratio (where the scaling is
100) will raise the ad valorem tariﬀ by 0.036. The estimated value of β3 of -0.29 implies that
if an industry has foreign political organization then the same increase in the inverse import
penetration-to-import elasticity ratio will lower the ad valorem tariﬀ by 0.017. Hence, we
see a countervailing inﬂuence on the U.S. tariﬀ of a similar magnitude exerted by foreign
lobbying. A more unconditional inference about lobbying organization and its impact on
tariﬀs may also be made: Consider a representative estimate of β2 and β3 of say, 0.2. Given
the mean value of x
m.￿ of 0.3 (see Table A.1. with descriptive statistics), this implies that on
average, holding all else constant, the presence of an organized foreign lobby lowers tariﬀs
in that industry by about 6 percent (which to say lowers the tariﬀ rate from, say, 12 percent
to 6 percent). Conversely, the presence of an organized domestic lobby raises the tariﬀ rate
in that industry by 7.5 percent. These estimates suggest economically signiﬁcant impacts of
domestic and foreign lobbying.
Finally, we observe the intuitively appealing result that these eﬀects are larger when I and I∗
are measured at higher percentile or spending requirements. Although the theory does not
explicitly recognize any ﬁxed costs of lobby formation and organization, in practice it is only
after spending exceeds certain amounts that we would expect the industry to be politically
organized for lobbying. The results suggest the presence of such ﬁxed costs.25
As the results reported in Tables I through IV indicate, our results are robust to changes
in the ways in which the data are handled (by varying thresholds levels for the assignment
25Of course, there are other potential explanations and our analysis does not conﬁrm this as the only
explanation for the observed pattern of coeﬃcient estimates. The “ﬁxed costs” explanation, however, seems
to be a compelling one. For a recent analytical investigation of the issue of endogenous determination of
lobbies (in a Grossman-Helpman context) in the presence of ﬁxed costs of lobby formation, see Mitra (1999).
21of I and I∗ or the measures of protection itself). A number of additional robustness checks
were also conducted by us. We discuss these here brieﬂy.26 The ﬁrst set of robustness checks
involved the time period of our sample. The fact that our sample follows a major multilateral
international trade negotiation round (the Tokyo round of the GATT) may raise doubts as to
whether other factors such as international bargaining inﬂuence our estimates.27 We should
note ﬁrst that proportionality associated with the tariﬀ reduction schemes implemented after
the Tokyo round mitigates this concern somewhat. Nevertheless, we repeated our exercises
using trade protection and FARA data from the period 1972-1975 (which preceded the Tokyo
round, which only started in 1976).28 The limitation on the FARA data from this time period
is that we do not have detailed data in the FARA reports on foreign agent activities. Specif-
ically there is no data for this time period on the actual expenditures by foreign lobbyists
and there are no data indicating speciﬁcally whether or not the foreign lobbyists made any
eﬀort to contact the US government. Lacking any data on actual expenditures, we proceeded
ﬁrst by using simply the 0th percentile criterion (i.e., a sector is assigned I∗ = 1 if it simply
appears in the FARA data base in each of the years under consideration). In these runs, the
theory still ﬁnds a conﬁrmation in the data: the coeﬃcient β2 is estimated signiﬁcant and
positive and the coeﬃcient β3 is estimated signiﬁcant and negative. Keeping in mind the
extent of persistence of lobbying activity that we see in data on both domestic and foreign
lobbying and in order to exploit the more detailed information that we have in our FARA
data set on spending in the later period, we estimated (13) diﬀerently using data on tariﬀs
and import penetration from the earlier period (1972-75) and data on political organization
from the later period (1978-82). This amounts to assuming that the distribution of lobbying
expenditures across industries in the period 1972-1975 was identical to the distribution in
the period 1978-1982. The results showed a remarkable degree of similarity with the results
26We do not present the results of these tests in detail here in the interest of brevity. The detailed results
were, however, reported in an earlier working paper version of this paper which is available from the authors
upon request.
27As such it is perhaps worth pointing out that this is a standing problem that has not adequately been
dealt with in the literature - the majority of studies on endogenous protection have simply ignored this issue.
28Of course, this too was preceded by other GATT negotiation rounds. Nevertheless, estimates obtained
using data before the Tokyo round after are roughly similar in magnitude to those obtained using data
after the Tokyo round - suggesting that equilibrium outcomes in trade negotiations too reﬂect the same
cross-sectional pressures.
22reported in Tables I-IV. Foreign organization was nearly always negatively correlated with
trade barriers and domestic lobbying nearly always positively so. The consistency of results
using tariﬀ rates from the period prior to the Tokyo round and those after the Tokyo round
should perhaps not be greatly surprising. It is only indicative of the fact that even when
trade barriers are negotiated internationally, equilibrium outcomes are subject to very same
(or similar) domestic lobbying pressures that would operate if international negotiations were
absent. The fact that lobbying data from a later period is used in a regression with trade
policy from a prior period makes these results a less reliable - but it is heartening to see that
our earlier results aren’t contradicted by this run.
A second set of robustness checks involved the protection measure. In addition to the overall
NTB coverage ratio, we also separated NTBs into simply quantitative NTBs and price NTBs
and found the results to be largely invariant to this ﬁner categorization. Foreign lobbying
appears to reduce protection and domestic lobbying appears to raise it.
Finally, since the left-hand-side variable in (13), is censored below zero for some industries
(for example, import subsidies that are akin to negative tariﬀs are not measured in the
tariﬀ data), we combined the Smith-Blundell (1986) method with Kelejian (1971) to obtain
estimates of the Tobit model (13). The results seem invariant to this change (qualitatively
speaking). Perhaps this should not be so surprising: the extent of censoring in the tariﬀ
data is small, and the Tobit results should therefore have been expected to be close to the
linear instrumental variables estimates.
Extended Regressions
The preceding regressions have all tested the implications of the theory in strict form−restricting
the number of variables on the right-hand side to those narrowly predicted by the theory.
However, the earlier literature on endogenous trade policy has suggested several other vari-
ables that may be relevant in explaining protection (see e.g., Baldwin (1985), Treﬂer (1993)
and Gawande (1998) for a detailed discussion). Thus, for instance, one may expect that
industries with higher seller concentration (and thus presumably more easily organized) or
23with higher degrees of unionized workers to be better able to secure protection. Industries
with greater numbers of low-skilled and low-wage workers or simply labor intensive indus-
tries may be more likely to get protection from governments which have “social justice”
motivations or are subject to democratic pressures. Tables V and VI present our ﬁnal set of
IV results for tariﬀs and NTBs, respectively, in which the speciﬁcation includes a number
of these additional variables on the right-hand side.29 We note ﬁrst that the coeﬃcients on
many of the variables have the signs suggested and conﬁrmed in the earlier literature.30 Thus,
unionization rates show up as positively impacting the protection rates as do concentration
ratios. Labor-intensive sectors (which are more likely importable sectors) receive higher pro-
tection (as indicated by the negative coeﬃcient on the K/L variable), as do industries with
lower wages (and presumably greater numbers of low-skilled workers). Importantly, both
our coeﬃcients of central concern, β2 and β3, retain their signs and statistical signiﬁcance
although they both see a drop in magnitudes.
Model Comparisons
Our ﬁnal set of results concerns the comparison of the extended models presented in Tables
V and IV with the parsimonious speciﬁcation (12) implied by the theory. We perform these
comparisons of these nested models using the Akaike information criteria (AIC) and the
Schwarz information criteria (SIC).31 The augmented model with nine explanatory variables
outperforms the corresponding parsimonious model on both criteria. For example, the AIC
value of 2.321 in the second column of Table V is lower than the AIC value of 1.281 in the
second column of Table IA. Hence, the extended model (at the 0th percentile I* cutoﬀ) is
29For brevity, we have only presented results where the threshold for I is set at 0.05 as in Table IA and
IB. Using the higher threshold of 0.10 or 0.25 did not make any qualitative diﬀerence to our results.
30A detailed discussion of the determinants of trade policy discussed in the earlier empirical literature and
the contrast in methodology with recent structural attempts is provided in the recent survey by Gawande
and Krishna (2001).
31These are preferred over other criteria such as adjusted R2 because they penalize excessive para-
meterization and reward parsimony. The AIC is computed as [−2(lnL − k)/n] and the SIC value as
[lnL/n − 0.5k/n(lnn)], where n is the sample size, k is the number of regressors, and lnL is the log of
value of the maximum likelihood function. It should be clear that lower AIC values are preferred, while
higher SIC values are preferred. While both criteria penalize the use of additional regressors more strictly
than does the adjusted R2, the SIC imposes this penalty more severely than does the AIC.
24preferred over its smaller counterpart by the Akaike criterion. The SIC value of 1.104 in
the second column of Table V is higher than the SIC value of 0.619 in the second column
of Table IA. The extended model is thus preferred over its smaller counterpart even by the
Schwarz criterion. The preference for the extended model is unanimous across all models
estimated, as well as across both measures of protection − tariﬀs and NTBs. An implication
of this ﬁnding is that the parsimonious model does omit possibly important inﬂuences. As it
stands, the comparison is between a model built on a sound theory (the parsimonious model)
against an ad hoc exploratory alternative (the extended model). In order for the comparison
to show the way for future models, the alternative hypothesis should ideally emerge from
analysis with the same level of rigor as the null. Nevertheless, the results from the extended
model suggest that the lobbying and electoral inﬂuence of unions and the determination of
lobbying organization itself are issues that among the important issues that deserve formal
treatment.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
Our primary interest in this paper is the study of foreign lobbies and their impact on trade
policy. We have pursued this using a structural methodology - where a theoretical framework
was developed and where the econometric work that followed was linked closely to this theory.
Further, to account for the possible role of variables that have traditionally been suggested
as determinants of trade policy (but which do not appear in the parsimonious speciﬁcation
implied by the theory we develop), we estimated “extended” speciﬁcations with a large
number of additional variables included in the regression equation.
Our results suggest that foreign lobbying has a statistically and economically signiﬁcant
impact on trade policy: The presence of an organized foreign lobby representing a particular
industrial sector appears to have as much eﬀect in lowering tariﬀs against imports in that
sector as does the presence of a domestic lobby in raising tariﬀs there. Ceteris paribus,U S
consumers gain unambiguously from the presence of foreign political activity. The results
are quite robust to changes in speciﬁcation.
25It is our hope that these results, which run counter to much of the popular opinion on
foreign lobbies, will contribute to the public debate that has recently arisen in the context of
discussions on campaign ﬁnance reform on the costs and beneﬁts of foreign lobbying activity.
26Appendix
The variables that appear in (13) are ad valorem tariﬀ rates, domestic production, imports,
import demand elasticities, domestic and foreign political organization. In this data appen-
dix, we provide a detailed description of data sources and data construction methodology
for the political organization variables (especially for foreign political organization). The re-
maining variables in (13) are quite familiar and we restrict ourselves to just a brief description
here. As we have discussed in the text, IV estimation of (13) also requires information on a
number of additional (instrumental) variables as does the estimation of the extended versions
of (13) we have presented in Tables X and XI. We discuss each of these variables in turn.
Foreign Political Organization: I∗
The data set used in the estimation of our empirical model was assembled using a report
that is sent annually from the U.S. Attorney General to the U.S. Congress. The report is
required by the 1938 legislation known as the Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA)32.
The report collects information about foreign agents, broadly deﬁned, operating within the
United States. The primary results presented in this paper used data taken from the reports
that covered calendar years 1978, 1979, 1981, and 198233.
Each entry in the FARA annual reports contains the following information:
1. Name and address of the foreign agent34,
2. Name of the foreign principal (usually a private ﬁrm, a industry association, or a
32From 1938 until 1950, the report was produced by the Department of State, and then beginning in about
1950, by the Department of Justice
33The 1980 report was not used because it alone was not distributed to the regional repository libraries as
it fell in-between the years during which hard-copy paper reports were sent out and when microﬁche reports
were subsequently distributed. Apparently, the one and only copy of it resides in the Department of Justice
library in Washington DC
34A foreign agent, in the view of the USDOJ, is somebody who (a.) engages in political activities or
acts in a public relations capacity for a foreign principal, (b.) solicits or dispenses any thing of value
within the United States for a foreign principal, or (c.) who represents the interests of a foreign prin-
cipal before any agency or oﬃcial of the U.S. government. This is taken from a “Q&A” document,
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fara/q A.htm.
27government agency),
3. The purpose of the agency, including any U.S. government entities contacted, and
4. Amount of money exchange in return for the agency services.
For each of the years in question there were generally about 1,300 entries. With the exception
of the name of the agent (not useful for our purposes), all of this data was transcribed into
an MS Excel spreadsheet, consisting of ﬁve columns:
(i.) The calendar year of the activity,
(ii.) The country of the principal,
(iii.) The name of the principal,
(iv.) The amount of money transacted for the agent’s representation, and
(v.) A “lobbying” indicator variable that was set to “1” if the description supplied in the
report mentioned that the agent contacted either the U.S. Congress or any other U.S.
government agency (including the military).
To this data, taken verbatim from the government report, we added a sixth column. This
represented our best guess for the U.S. Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) code that the
industry would fall into (were it producing in the U.S.). This was done using a combination
of the principal’s name (which was often quite straightforward, as in the case of sugar
cooperatives), the description of the representation activity in the FARA report (again,
often helpful if it mentioned, for instance, that the principal was concerned about U.S.
automobile safety regulations), and standard business research tools that provide insight
into an organization’s line of business.
Our object was to provide each entry in our four-year FARA database with a three-digit
SIC code. This task was made easier through the use of a computer-searchable version of
28the SIC Handbook available on-line35 which allowed us to classify even the most detailed of
components. Allowance was made for the fact that while the government handbook used the
1987-version of the SIC system, the 1982 data set from the Gawande and Bandhyopadhyay
(2000) paper, which we used for information on other variables, was based on the 1972-version
of the SIC system. Only a small fraction of the entries had to have their 1987-version SIC
codes changed to ﬁt the 1972 scheme. We used the full range of the SIC system, even
assigning 9XX SIC codes to principals that were from the government sector, despite the
fact that for this paper we were only interested in SIC codes from the 200 – 399 range, that
is, the manufacturing industries.
Categorization of the Raw Data
The following is a breakdown of the original 5,302 entries by category of the foreign principal:
1. Fully 34% of the entries were from either tourist boards or government and/or private
chambers of commerce that encourage general business contacts.36
2. 21% of the entries were related to government to government contacts that fall into
the realm of international relations and not lobbying for a particular industry.
3. 18% of the entries fell into the service industries (SIC codes 400 – 859).
4. 5% were either agricultural or raw material industries (SIC codes 001 – 199).
5. Only 4% of the entries were foreign political parties that were campaigning among
ethnic diasporas or seeking U.S. government recognition for their cause.
35see http://www.osha.gov/oshstats/sicser.html.
36The large number of entries that fall into this category is somewhat puzzling because these agents, while
they do meet the criteria mentioned in the above footnote, certainly qualify for exemption from reporting
based on the following passage from the same document (http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fara/q A.htm).
“For example, diplomats and oﬃcials of foreign governments, and their staﬀs, are exempt if properly recog-
nized by the U.S. State Department. Persons whose activities are of a purely commercial nature or of a
religious, academic, and charitable nature are exempt. Lawyers engaged in legal representation of foreign
principals in the courts or similar type proceedings, so long as the attorney does not try to inﬂuence policy
at the behest of his client, are exempt. Any agent who is engaged in lobbying activities and is registered
under the Lobbying Disclosure Act is exempt”.
296. The remaining 18% were manufacturing industries in which we were interested. So,
out of our four years of data, we ended up working with 934 entries from 71 diﬀerent
countries.
Because it was often impossible to neatly divide entries into a single SIC code, in less than
15% of the 934 entries, we assigned two or (rarely) three SIC codes to a single entry and
then divided the lobbying fees listed in the report equally among these other codes. So,
for instance, if a lumber company was listed as having paid $10,000 for a lobbying eﬀort in
the U.S., we divided this sum into two entries: $5,000 under SIC 241 and $5,000 under SIC
242. Note that the numbers of entries provided above were tabulated before any splitting of
entries took place.
Constructing the Input Table from the Raw Data
In order to incorporate this raw data into our empirical model, we had to convert the above
an indicator variable, “0” for unorganized and “1” for organized, that would correspond to
each SIC code in our data set. This would allow us to compare tariﬀs in industries with
only an organized domestic sector versus those with both a domestic and foreign organized
lobbying presence.
In the interest of being able to later perform sensitivity analysis on our classiﬁcation of the
data, we used several diﬀerent criteria in the assignment of the indicator variable. The most
signiﬁcant axis on which we divided the data set was:
1. Using the entire 934 entries on the basis that because all of these principals hired
lawyers in the U.S. to represent them in some capacity, that they must be “organized”
in a political-inﬂuence sense. Even if the U.S. government was not lobbied directly in
many cases, it is plausible to assume that having a paid representative in the nation’s
capitol would provide some added support, even if it relied upon informal contacts
among individuals in the lobbying community.
2. Using a much more restrictive criteria to determine political organization: that is,
30counting an industrial sector as organized only if it had a current contract that paid a
positive amount of money and if the description of the activity provided in the FARA
report speciﬁcally mentioned a U.S. government agency as having been contacted. Ap-
plying these restrictions reduces the number of usable entries to 437 from 48 countries.
It is interesting to note that the industrial sector (SICs 200-399) have a much higher pro-
portion of entries that fall into the more restrictive “organized” category as described above.
For the data set as a whole, only 22.6% (1200 out of 5302) of entries featured positive levels
of lobbying and a direct lobbying connection to the U.S. government. But this contrasts
with the 47% of SICs 200 – 399 industries (438/935) that met both criteria.
To obtain sectoral spending per unit value-added of imports, we used sectoral value-added
in imports data provided by the UNCTAD. Total FARA expenditures by Industry were
divided by imports value-added to obtained the percentile distribution of spending per unit
value-added (for each of the cases corresponding to criteria 1 and 2 above) These distribution
was then used to assign the foreign political organization dummy using quartile thresholds
indicated in the results Tables I-XI.
Domestic Political Organization: I
Domestic political organization was assigned using methodology identical to that used by
Gawande and Bandhyopadhyay (2000) The variable Ii equals 1 if Political Action Committee
campaign contributions/value-added by lobbies associated with industry i are greater than
the threshold limits indicated in the tables. PAC spending data were obtained from the
Federal Election Commission (FEC) for the four congressional election cycles 1977-78, 1979-
80, 1981-82, and 1983-84.
Since corporate PACs are associated with individual ﬁrms they were mapped into SIC indus-
tries as follows. Using COMPUSTAT tapes, ﬁrms were classiﬁed into three digit or four-digit
SIC industries. COMPUSTAT data apply only to publicly traded ﬁrms, which constitutes
a small percentage of ﬁrms associated with corporate PACS.
Where possible, the remaining PACs were classiﬁed into two-digit SIC industries using the
31mapping in Weinberger and Greavey (1984). The classiﬁcation of PACs to SIC industries
in this manner is one-to-many due to the multi-product nature of most ﬁrms. For example,
it is possible that PAC spending by a ﬁrm, say, Firm A, maps into a four-digit industry
(5555), a three-digit industry (333) and a two-digit industry (22). In the absence of further
information, our methodology was to split the PAC spending equally across all four-digit
industries into which the spending is mapped (summing up the mapped PAC expenditures at
the industry level would erroneously inﬂate the measure of PAC spending for some industries
and understate it for others). In the example, suppose PAC spending by Firm A maps into
ﬁfteen four-digit industries (say, one given by 5555, four industries 333x, and ten industries
22xx), and Firm A spent $300,000. Then each of these ﬁfteen four-digit industries would
be allotted $20,000 due to PAC spending by A. For any four-digit SIC industry, summing
across the allotments from various corporate PACs, we obtain total PAC spending by that
industry.
Labor PAC spending is not included in the analysis because most labor PACs are organized
not by industry but by trade, and hence are diﬃcult to classify into SIC industries. For
example, the electrical workers who are employed across all SIC industries are organized
as the (various regional) International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers PAC(s). A few
important exceptions do exist. Thus, contributions by the United Auto Workers Union
(UAW PAC) would in fact map precisely into the auto industries. We decided to maintain
our focus on corporate PACs. Since the big three auto ﬁrms were large contributors, adding
the expenditures of the UAW does not change the construction of I, which is the main use
to which the PAC data are put.
Other Variables
The remaining variables that appear directly in (13) are:
Xi
mi, the inverse of the import penetration ratio, measured as sectoral [production/imports]/100.
To construct this variable, value-added data were obtained from the American Survey of
Manufactures and data on imports were obtained from the Compatible Trade and Produc-
32tion (COMTAP) database.
￿i, the sectoral import demand elasticities, which were obtained directly from the well known
study of Shiells, Stern and Deardorﬀ (1986). See the discussion in Goldberg and Maggi
(1999).
ti, the eﬀective ad-valorem tariﬀ rates on imports, measured as the customs collection rates,
which were obtained from Professor Robert Feenstra’s database maintained at:
http://www.internationaldata.org/.
NTB Coverage Ratios, the protection measure capturing NTB protection, is the propor-
tion of imports subject to an NTB barrier. This was obtained using data from the UNCTAD
and World Bank Study on non-tariﬀ barriers to trade. See Gawande and Bandhyopadhyay
(2000) for details.
As discussed in the text, estimation of (13) involved the use of instrumental variables for
endogeneity correction. The instruments we used are the actual values, squares and a subset
of cross products of the following variables (mostly obtained from the Annual Survey of
Manufactures):
log(herﬁndahl), the log of the herﬁndahl index of ﬁrm concentration within an industry
% Scientists and Engineers, the fraction of employees that are scientists and engineers
% Unskilled, the fraction of employees classiﬁed as unskilled
Scale, the output per ﬁrm
K/L, the capital labor ratio interacted with industry dummies and also
33%exports sold to the US for the ﬁve major exporters to the US France, Germany, Italy,
Japan and the UK.
Finally, the Extended Models include, in addition to some of the variables discussed above,
the following regressors (also mostly obtained from the Annual Survey of Manufactures):
Conc, the 4-ﬁrm conc ratio
% Unionized, the fraction of the employees who are unionized
Wage, the production wage
K/L, the capital labor ratio.
Squares (but not cross products) of all instruments are used in the extended models for
endogeneity correction.
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36A.1. Descriptive Statistics





















The units of measurement and scaling are as follows: X
m is to be multiplied by 100, Scale is in billions of dollars, Employment
is in millions, Wage is average production wage in thousands of dollars per hour, the K/L ratio is in ten thousand dollars per
worker, the rest of the variables are in percentage terms or unit-less. See Data Appendix for detailed variable deﬁnitions.Table IA: Foreign Political Activity and Tariﬀs (1978-1982)
(Domestic PAC Spending/$ 1K Value Added Cutoﬀ: 0.05)
Parameters I∗ Expenditures I∗ Expenditures I∗ Expenditures I∗ Expenditures
0thPercentile 25thPercentile 50thPercentile 75thPercentile
β1 -0.007 -0.011 -0.015 -0.015
(0.606) (0.940) (1.265) (1.315)
β2 0.259 0.334 0.359 0.347
(4.203) (5.373) (5.588) (5.726)
β3 -0.766 -0.241 -0.29 -0.286
(1.305) (2.860) (3.282) (3.329)
L 161.86 180.237 174.827 180.016
% Obs with I∗ = 1 0.52 0.22 0.08 0.04
% Obs with I = 1 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65
AIC -1.28 -1.43 -1.39 -1.43
SIC 0.62 0.69 0.67 0.69
Table IB: Tariﬀs with Foreign Activity Directed To Govt (1978-1982)
(Domestic PAC Spending/$ 1K Value Added Cutoﬀ: 0.05)
Parameters I∗ Expenditures I∗ Expenditures I∗ Expenditures I∗ Expenditures
0thPercentile 25thPercentile 50thPercentile 75thPercentile
β1 -0.008 -0.014 -0.015 -0.016
(0.682) (1.242) (1.309) (1.327)
β2 0.326 0.331 0.347 0.35
(4.709) (5.557) (5.719) (5.730)
β3 -0.186 -0.257 -0.286 -0.29
(2.288) (3.010) (3.324) (3.356)
L 167.949 183.59 179.87 179.238
% Obs with I∗ = 1 0.33 0.125 0.05 0.04
% Obs with I = 1 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65
AIC -1.33 -1.46 -1.43 -1.42
SIC 0.64 0.71 0.69 0.69
In each of the regressions, the domestic lobbies are taken to be organized if PAC expenditure for every thousand dollars of
sectoral value added is greater than 0.05. In Table B, a speciﬁc indication of contact with the US government in the the FARA
report is an additional requirement for the foreign political organization dummy to take the value one. See main text for details.
The ﬁgures in parentheses are t-statistics (absolute values). L denotes the log-likelihood ratio. % Obs with I∗ = 1 and % Obs
with I = 1 denote the fraction of the total sample for which the dummy variables I∗ and I were assigned a value of 1.Table IIA: Foreign Political Activity and NTBs (1978-1982)
(Domestic PAC Spending/$ 1K Value Added Cutoﬀ: 0.05)
Parameters I∗ Expenditures I∗ Expenditures I∗ Expenditures I∗ Expenditures
0thPercentile 25thPercentile 50thPercentile 75thPercentile
β1 -0.012 -0.015 -0.019 -0.019
(0.578) (0.748) (0.950) (0.962)
β2 0.308 0.442 0.461 0.443
(2.955) (4.151) (4.267) (4.311)
β3 -0.006 -0.263 -0.301 -0.283
(0.061) (1.824) (2.022) (1.945)
L 31.68 46.215 45.451 49.378
% Obs with I∗ = 1 0.52 0.22 0.08 0.04
% Obs with I = 1 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43
AIC -0.23 -0.35 -0.34 -0.37
SIC 0.09 0.15 0.15 0.17
Table IIB: NTBs with Foreign Activity Directed To Govt (1978-1982)
(Domestic PAC Spending/$ 1K Value Added Cutoﬀ: 0.05)
Parameters I∗ Expenditures I∗ Expenditures I∗ Expenditures I∗ Expenditures
0thPercentile 25thPercentile 50thPercentile 75thPercentile
β1 -0.012 -0.017 -0.019 -0.194
(0.588) (0.879) (0.959) (0.972)
β2 0.359 0.415 0.443 0.446
(3.050) (4.042) (4.306) (4.320)
β3 -0.086 -0.229 -0.283 -0.028
(0.622) (1.559) (1.943) (1.970)
L 36.024 48.935 49.218 49.156
% Obs with I∗ = 1 0.33 0.125 0.05 0.04
% Obs with I = 1 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43
AIC -0.27 -0.37 -0.37 -0.37
SIC 0.11 0.16 0.17 0.16
In each of the regressions, the domestic lobbies are taken to be organized if PAC expenditure for every thousand dollars of
sectoral value added is greater than 0.05. In Table B, a speciﬁc indication of contact with the US government in the the FARA
report is an additional requirement for the foreign political organization dummy to take the value one. See main text for details.
The ﬁgures in parentheses are t-statistics (absolute values). L denotes the log-likelihood ratio. % Obs with I∗ = 1 and % Obs
with I = 1 denote the fraction of the total sample for which the dummy variables I∗ and I were assigned a value of 1.Table IIIA: Foreign Political Activity and Tariﬀs (1978-1982)
(Domestic PAC Spending/$ 1K Value Added Cutoﬀ: 0.10)
Parameters I∗ Expenditures I∗ Expenditures I∗ Expenditures I∗ Expenditures
0thPercentile 25thPercentile 50thPercentile 75thPercentile
β1 0.007 0.003 -0.004 -0.004
(0.576) (0.197) (0.303) (0.341)
β2 0.26 0.631 0.665 0.596
(2.689) (4.031) (4.258) (4.532)
β3 -0.062 -0.511 -0.564 -0.509
(0.870) (3.108) (3.383) (3.523)
L 151.61 124.506 118.192 138.408
% Obs with I∗ = 1 0.52 0.22 0.08 0.04
% Obs with I = 1 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65
AIC -1.20 -0.98 -0.93 -1.09
SIC 0.58 0.47 0.44 0.52
Table IIIB: Tariﬀs with Foreign Activity Directed To Govt (1978-1982)
(Domestic PAC Spending/$ 1K Value Added Cutoﬀ: 0.10)
Parameters I∗ Expenditures I∗ Expenditures I∗ Expenditures I∗ Expenditures
0thPercentile 25thPercentile 50thPercentile 75thPercentile
β1 0.008 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005
(0.659) (0.273) (0.331) (0.364)
β2 0.36 0.57 0.596 0.605
(2.964) (4.335) (4.521) (4.532)
β3 -0.177 -0.478 -0.508 -0.519
(1.593) (3.273) (3.513) (3.541)
L 144.148 143.28 138.17 136.32
% Obs with I∗ = 1 0.33 0.125 0.05 0.04
% Obs with I = 1 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65
AIC -1.14 -1.13 -1.09 -1.08
SIC 0.55 0.54 0.52 0.52
In each of the regressions, the domestic lobbies are taken to be organized if PAC expenditure for every thousand dollars of
sectoral value added is greater than 0.10. In Table B, a speciﬁc indication of contact with the US government in the the FARA
report is an additional requirement for the foreign political organization dummy to take the value one. See main text for details.
The ﬁgures in parentheses are t-statistics (absolute values). L denotes the log-likelihood ratio. % Obs with I∗ = 1 and % Obs
with I = 1 denote the fraction of the total sample for which the dummy variables I∗ and I were assigned a value of 1.Table IVA: Foreign Political Activity and NTBs (1978-1982)
(Domestic PAC Spending/$ 1K Value Added Cutoﬀ: 0.10)
Parameters I∗ Expenditures I∗ Expenditures I∗ Expenditures I∗ Expenditures
0thPercentile 25thPercentile 50thPercentile 75thPercentile
β1 0.008 0.007 0.002 0.002
(0.429) (0.379) (0.105) (0.119)
β2 0.186 0.639 0.648 0.579
(1.243) (2.736) (2.861) (2.921)
β3 0.08 -0.436 -0.458 -0.396
(0.730) (1.778) (1.891) (1.818)
L 44.016 25.111 25.937 36.782
% Obs with I∗ = 1 0.52 0.22 0.08 0.04
% Obs with I = 1 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65
AIC -0.33 -0.18 -0.19 -0.27
SIC 0.14 0.07 0.07 0.11
Table IVB: NTBs with Foreign Activity Directed To Govt (1978-1982)
(Domestic PAC Spending/$ 1K Value Added Cutoﬀ: 0.10)
Parameters I∗ Expenditures I∗ Expenditures I∗ Expenditures I∗ Expenditures
0thPercentile 25thPercentile 50thPercentile 75thPercentile
β1 0.009 0.004 0.002 0.002
(0.461) (0.220) (0.124) (0.103)
β2 0.193 0.51 0.578 0.587
(1.047) (2.554) (2.914) (2.935)
β3 0.082 -0.309 -0.394 -0.405
(0.486) (1.395) (1.812) (1.844)
L 40.941 39.827 36.563 36.054
% Obs with I∗ = 1 0.33 0.125 0.05 0.04
% Obs with I = 1 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65
AIC -0.31 -0.30 -0.27 -0.27
SIC 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.11
In each of the regressions, the domestic lobbies are taken to be organized if PAC expenditure for every thousand dollars of
sectoral value added is greater than 0.10. In Table B, a speciﬁc indication of contact with the US government in the the FARA
report is an additional requirement for the foreign political organization dummy to take the value one. See main text for details.
The ﬁgures in parentheses are t-statistics (absolute values). L denotes the log-likelihood ratio. % Obs with I∗ = 1 and % Obs
with I = 1 denote the fraction of the total sample for which the dummy variables I∗ and I were assigned a value of 1.Table V: Foreign Political Activity and Tariﬀs - Extended Speciﬁcation
(1978-1982)
(Domestic PAC Spending/$ 1K Value Added Cutoﬀ: 0.05)
Parameters I∗ Expenditures I∗ Expenditures I∗ Expenditures I∗ Expenditures
0thPercentile 25thPercentile 50thPercentile 75thPercentile
β1 0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004
(0.143) (0.273) (0.531) (0.587)
β2 0.154 0.157 0.151 0.152
(3.271) (3.297) (3.053) (3.057)
β3 -0.12 -0.175 -0.165 -0.159
(3.235) (3.123) (2.717) (2.729)
Concentration Ratio 0.083 0.069 0.072 0.073
(2.883) (2.493) (2.631) (2.654)
Scale -0.209 -0.463 -0.482 -0.458
(0.661) (1.593) (1.670) (1.578)
% Unionized 0.068 0.082 0.082 0.075
(2.635) (3.213) (3.200) (2.978)
Wage -0.342 -0.612 -0.886 -0.695
(0.169) (0.309) (0.441) (0.348)
K/L ratio -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(2.616) (2.347) (2.159) (2.214)
L 295.82 304.2 305.9 304.8
% Obs with I∗ = 1 0.52 0.22 0.08 0.04
% Obs with I = 1 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65
AIC -2.32 -2.39 -2.40 -2.39
SIC 1.10 1.14 1.14 1.14
In each of the regressions, the domestic lobbies are taken to be organized if PAC expenditure for every thousand dollars of
sectoral value added is greater than 0.05. See main text for details. The ﬁgures in parentheses are t-statistics (absolute values).
L denotes the log-likelihood ratio. % Obs with I∗ = 1 and % Obs with I = 1 denote the fraction of the total sample for which
the dummy variables I∗ and I were assigned a value of 1.Table VI: Foreign Political Activity and NTBs (1978-1982)
(Domestic PAC Spending/$ 1K Value Added Cutoﬀ: 0.05)
Parameters I∗ Expenditures I∗ Expenditures I∗ Expenditures I∗ Expenditures
0thPercentile 25thPercentile 50thPercentile 75thPercentile
β1 0.0001 -0.003 -0.005 -0.006
(0.003) (0.188) -0.322 (0.375)
β2 0.285 0.323 0.311 0.325
(0.110) (2.875) 2.662 (2.758)
β3 -0.115 -0.224 -0.206 -0.22
(1.330) (1.706) -1.441 (1.593)
Concentration Ratio 0.076 0.062 0.066 0.067
(1.135) (0.950) 1.017 (1.025)
Scale 1.412 1.187 1.162 1.201
(1.906) (1.741) 1.709 (1.745)
% Unionized 0.058 0.076 0.075 0.068
(0.943) (1.262) 1.239 (1.129)
Wage -3.053 -3.737 -4.039 -3.989
(0.642) (0.804) -0.852 (0.842)
K/L ratio -0.0001 0.003 0.001 0.0005
(0.047) (0.118) 0.217 (0.199)
L 84.37 92.87 93.3 90.9
% Obs with I∗ = 1 0.52 0.22 0.08 0.04
% Obs with I = 1 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65
AIC -0.62 -0.68 -0.688 -0.67
SIC 0.25 0.29 0.287 0.28
In each of the regressions, the domestic lobbies are taken to be organized if PAC expenditure for every thousand dollars of
sectoral value added is greater than 0.05. See main text for details. The ﬁgures in parentheses are t-statistics (absolute values).
L denotes the log-likelihood ratio. % Obs with I∗ = 1 and % Obs with I = 1 denote the fraction of the total sample for which
the dummy variables I∗ and I were assigned a value of 1.